_Socr._ Surely not. But, as it seems, he will sow and write, when he does write, in the gardens of letters for the sake of diversion, treasuring up memoranda for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for all who are going on the same track, and he will be delighted at seeing them in their tender growth, and while other men pursue other diversions, refreshing themselves with banquets, and other pleasures akin to these, he, as it appears, instead of these, will pass his time in the diversions I have mentioned. 140. _Phæ._ You speak of a very noble in comparison of a mean diversion, Socrates, when a man is able to divert himself with discourses, telling stories about justice and the other things you mention. _Socr._ It is so indeed, my dear Phædrus. But, in my opinion, a far more noble employment results from this, when a man availing himself of dialectic art, on meeting with a congenial soul, plants and sows scientific discourses which are able to aid both themselves and him that planted them, and are not unfruitful but contain seed within themselves, from whence others springing up in other minds are able to make this seed immortal, and make their possessor happy as far as it is possible for man to be so. _Phæ._ This that you mention is far more noble. _Socr._ Now then, Phædrus, since this is agreed on, we are able to determine our former questions. _Phæ._ What are they? _Socr._ Those which, in our desire to consider them, led us to the present point: namely, that we might examine into the reproach cast on Lysias for writing speeches, and then speeches themselves, which are written by art or without art. Now that which is artistic and that which is not appears to me to have been tolerably well explained. 141. _Phæ._ It appears so. But remind me of it again, in what way. _Socr._ Before a man knows the truth of each subject on which he speaks or writes, and is able to define the whole of a thing, and when he has defined it again knows how to divide it into species until he comes to the indivisible; and in like manner, having distinguished the nature of the soul, and having found out what kind of speech is adapted to the nature of each, he so disposes and adorns his speech, applying to a soul of varied powers speeches that are various and all-harmonious, and simple ones to a simple soul, before this is done, he will not be able to manage speech with art, as far as it might be done, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading, as the whole of our former argument has proved. _Phæ._ This is exactly how it appeared. 142. _Socr._ But what as to its being honourable or disgraceful to speak and write speeches, and under what circumstances it may be called a reproach or not, has not what we have said a little before sufficed to prove? _Phæ._ What was that?