_Socr._ What then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not? _Cri._ Surely it is not right, Socrates. _Socr._ But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated, is that right or not? _Cri._ By no means. _Socr_. For to do evil to men, differs in no respect from committing injustice. _Cri._ You say truly. _Socr._ It is not right, therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil to any man, however one may have suffered from him. But take care Crito, that in allowing these things, you do not allow them contrary to your opinion. For I know that to some few only these things both do appear and will appear to be true. They then to whom these things appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common, and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other’s opinions. Consider well then, whether you coincide and think with me; and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point, that it is never right either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when one has been evil-entreated to revenge one’s-self by doing evil in return; or, do you dissent from and not coincide in this principle? For so it appears to me both long since and now; but if you in any respect think otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former opinions, hear what follows. _Cri._ I do persist in them and think with you. Speak on then. _Socr._ I say next then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has promised to do things that are just, he ought to do them, or evade his promise? _Cri._ He ought to do them. 11. _Socr._ Observe then what follows. By departing hence without the leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to whom we ought least of all to do it, or not? And do we abide by what we agreed on as being just, or do we not? _Cri._ I am unable to answer your question, Socrates: for I do not understand it. _Socr._ Then consider it thus. If while we were preparing to run away, or by whatever name we should call it, the laws and commonwealth should come and, presenting themselves before us, should say: “Tell me, Socrates, what do you purpose doing? Do you design any thing else by this proceeding in which you are engaged, than to destroy us, the laws, and the whole city as far as you are able? Or do you think it possible for that city any longer to subsist and not be subverted, in which judgments that are passed have no force, but are set aside and destroyed by private persons?” What should we say, Crito, to these and similar remonstrances? For any one, especially an orator, would have much to say on the violation of the law, which enjoins that judgments passed shall be enforced. Shall we say to them that the city has done us an injustice and not passed a right sentence? Shall we say this, or what else? _Cri._ This, by Jupiter, Socrates.