The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
sophistry and persuasion back to this last possible ground of its
existence, and referred it to the peculiar character of concepts, _i.e._,
to the procedure of reason itself. Therefore, as my exposition has led me
to it, though it is very easily understood, I will illustrate it in the
following table by means of a schema. This table is intended to show how
the spheres of concepts overlap each other at many points, and so leave
room for a passage from each concept to whichever one we please of several
other concepts. I hope, however, that no one will be led by this table to
attach more importance to this little explanation, which I have merely
given in passing, than ought to belong to it, from the nature of the
subject. I have chosen as an illustration the concept of travelling. Its
sphere partially includes four others, to any of which the sophist may
pass at will; these again partly include other spheres, several of them
two or more at once, and through these the sophist takes whichever way he
chooses, always as if it were the only way, till at last he reaches, in
good or evil, whatever end he may have in view. In passing from one sphere
to another, it is only necessary always to follow the direction from the
centre (the given chief concept) to the circumference, and never to
reverse this process. Such a piece of sophistry may be either an unbroken
speech, or it may assume the strict syllogistic form, according to what is
the weak side of the hearer. Most scientific arguments, and especially
philosophical demonstrations, are at bottom not much more than this, for
how else would it be possible, that so much, in different ages, has not
only been falsely apprehended (for error itself has a different source),
but demonstrated and proved, and has yet afterwards been found to be
fundamentally wrong, for example, the Leibnitz-Wolfian Philosophy,
Ptolemaic Astronomy, Stahl’s Chemistry, Newton’s Theory of Colours, &c.
&c.(15)
§ 10. Through all this, the question presses ever more upon us, how
_certainty_ is to be attained, how _judgments __ are to be established_,
what constitutes _rational knowledge_, (_wissen_), and _science_, which we
rank with language and deliberate action as the third great benefit
conferred by reason.