The World as Will and Idea — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer · German
Reason is feminine in nature; it can only give after it has received. Of
itself it has nothing but the empty forms of its operation. There is no
absolutely pure rational knowledge except the four principles to which I
have attributed metalogical truth; the principles of identity,
contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason of knowledge. For
even the rest of logic is not absolutely pure rational knowledge. It
presupposes the relations and the combinations of the spheres of concepts.
But concepts in general only exist after experience of ideas of
perception, and as their whole nature consists in their relation to these,
it is clear that they presuppose them. No special content, however, is
presupposed, but merely the existence of a content generally, and so logic
as a whole may fairly pass for pure rational science. In all other
sciences reason has received its content from ideas of perception; in
mathematics from the relations of space and time, presented in intuition
or perception prior to all experience; in pure natural science, that is,
in what we know of the course of nature prior to any experience, the
content of the science proceeds from the pure understanding, _i.e._, from
the _a priori_ knowledge of the law of causality and its connection with
those pure intuitions or perceptions of space and time. In all other
sciences everything that is not derived from the sources we have just
referred to belongs to experience. Speaking generally, _to know
rationally_ (_wissen_) means to have in the power of the mind, and capable
of being reproduced at will, such judgments as have their sufficient
ground of knowledge in something outside themselves, _i.e._, are true.
Thus only abstract cognition is _rational knowledge_ (_wissen_), which is
therefore the result of reason, so that we cannot accurately say of the
lower animals that they _rationally __ know_ (_wissen_) anything, although
they have apprehension of what is presented in perception, and memory of
this, and consequently imagination, which is further proved by the
circumstance that they dream. We attribute consciousness to them, and
therefore although the word (_bewusstsein_) is derived from the verb to
know rationally (_wissen_), the conception of consciousness corresponds
generally with that of idea of whatever kind it may be. Thus we attribute
life to plants, but not consciousness. _Rational knowledge_ (_wissen_) is
therefore abstract consciousness, the permanent possession in concepts of
the reason, of what has become known in another way.