Since the will becomes objective, _i.e._, passes over into the idea, matter is the universal substratum of this objectification, or rather it is this objectification itself taken abstractly, _i.e._, regarded apart from all form. Matter is accordingly the _visibility_ of the will in general, while the character of its definite manifestations has its expression in form and quality. Hence what in the manifestation, _i.e._, for the idea, is _matter_ is in itself _will_. Therefore, under the conditions of experience and perception, everything holds good of it that holds good of the will in itself, and it repeats all the relations and properties of the will in temporal images. Accordingly it is the substance of the world of perception, as the will is the inner nature of all things. The forms are innumerable, the matter is one; just as the will is one in all its objectifications. As the will never objectifies itself as general, _i.e._, as absolute will, but always as particular, _i.e._, under special determinations and a given character, so matter never appears as such, but always in connection with some particular form and quality. In the manifestation or objectification of the will matter represents its totality, it itself, which in all is one, as matter is one in all bodies. As the will is the inmost kernel of all phenomenal beings, so matter is the substance which remains after all the accidents have been taken away. As the will is that which is absolutely indestructible in all existence, so matter is that which is imperishable in time and permanent through all changes. That matter for itself, thus separated from form, cannot be perceived or presented in imagination depends upon the fact that in itself, and as the pure substantiality of bodies, it is really the _will_ itself. But the will cannot be apprehended objectively, or perceived in itself, but only under all the conditions of the _idea_, and therefore only as _phenomenon_. Under these conditions, however, it exhibits itself at once as body, _i.e._, as matter clothed in form and quality. But form is conditioned by space, and quality or power of acting by causality; thus both depend upon the functions of the intellect. Matter without them would just be the thing in itself, _i.e._, the will itself. Therefore, as has been said, Plotinus and Giordano Bruno could only be brought by a completely objective path to the assertion that matter in and for itself is without extension, consequently without spatial properties, consequently incorporeal.