The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3) — Schopenhauer — John Shaqi
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 3 of 3)
Schopenhauer · en
Because, then, matter is the visibility of the will, and every force in
itself is will, no force can appear without a material substratum, and
conversely no body can be without forces dwelling in it which constitute
its quality. Therefore a body is the union of matter and form which is
called substance (Stoff). Force and substance are inseparable because at
bottom they are one; for, as Kant has shown, matter itself is given us
only as the union of two forces, the force of expansion and that of
attraction. Thus there is no opposition between force and substance,
rather they are precisely one.
Led by the course of our consideration to this standpoint, and having
attained to this metaphysical view of matter, we will confess without
reluctance that the temporal _origin_ of forms, shapes, or species cannot
reasonably be sought elsewhere than in matter. Some time or other they
must have come forth from it, just because it is the mere _visibility of
the will_ which constitutes the inner nature of all phenomena. In that the
will manifests itself, _i.e._, presents itself _objectively_ to the
intellect, matter, as its visibility, assumes _form_ by means of the
functions of the intellect. Hence the Schoolmen said: “_Materia appetit
formam_.” That such was the origin of all forms of life cannot be doubted:
we cannot even conceive it otherwise. Whether, however, now, since the
paths to the perpetuation of the forms stand open, and are secured and
sustained by nature with boundless care and jealousy, _generatio œquivoca_
still takes place, can only be decided by experience; especially since the
saying, _Natura nihil facit frustra_, might, with reference to the paths
of regular propagation, be used as a valid argument against it. Yet in
spite of the most recent objections to it, I hold that at very low grades
_generatio œquivoca_ is very probable, and primarily indeed in the case of
entozoa and epizoa, particularly such as appear in consequence of special
cachexia of the animal organism. For the conditions of their life only
appear exceptionally; consequently their species cannot propagate itself
in the regular manner, and therefore has always to arise anew whenever
opportunity offers. Therefore as soon as the conditions of life of epizoa
have appeared in consequence of certain chronic diseases, or cachexia, and
in accordance with them, _pediculus capitis_ or _pubis_ or _corporis_
appears entirely of itself, and without any egg; and this notwithstanding
the complex structure of these insects, for the putrefaction of a living
animal body affords material for higher productions than that of hay in
water, which only produces infusoria. Or is it thought more likely that
the eggs of the epizoa are constantly floating about in the air in
expectation? (Fearful to think of!) Let us rather remember the disease of
phthiriasis, which occurs even now. An analogous case takes place when
through special circumstances the conditions of life appear of a species