Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 1 — Baruch Spinoza — John Shaqi
Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 1
Baruch Spinoza · en
(5) Now it is evident, from the definition above given, that prophecy really
includes ordinary knowledge; for the knowledge which we acquire by our
natural faculties depends on knowledge of God and His eternal laws; but
ordinary knowledge is common to all men as men, and rests on foundations
which all share, whereas the multitude always strains after rarities
and exceptions, and thinks little of the gifts of nature; so that, when
prophecy is talked of, ordinary knowledge is not supposed to be included.
(6) Nevertheless it has as much right as any other to be called Divine, for
God's nature, in so far as we share therein, and God's laws, dictate it to
us; nor does it suffer from that to which we give the preeminence, except in
so far as the latter transcends its limits and cannot be accounted for by
natural laws taken in themselves. (7) In respect to the certainty it
involves, and the source from which it is derived, i.e. God, ordinary
knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic, unless indeed we believe, or
rather dream, that the prophets had human bodies but superhuman minds, and
therefore that their sensations and consciousness were entirely different
from our own.
(8) But, although ordinary knowledge is Divine, its professors cannot be
called prophets [Endnote 2], for they teach what the rest of mankind could
perceive and apprehend, not merely by simple faith, but as surely and
honourably as themselves.
(9) Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself and partakes
of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is enabled to form notions
explaining natural phenomena and inculcating morality, it follows that we
may rightly assert the nature of the human mind (in so far as it is thus
conceived) to be a primary cause of Divine revelation. (10) All that we
clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us, as I have just pointed
out, by the idea and nature of God; not indeed through words, but in a way
far more excellent and agreeing perfectly with the nature of the mind, as
all who have enjoyed intellectual certainty will doubtless attest. (11)
Here, however, my chief purpose is to speak of matters having reference to
Scripture, so these few words on the light of reason will suffice.
(12) I will now pass on to, and treat more fully, the other ways and means
by which God makes revelations to mankind, both of that which transcends
ordinary knowledge, and of that within its scope; for there is no reason why
God should not employ other means to communicate what we know already by the
power of reason.