A Philosophical Dictionary, Volume 05 — Voltaire — John Shaqi
A Philosophical Dictionary, Volume 05
Voltaire · en
"I answer, in the first place, that we cannot possibly doubt either the
great power or the great skill of nature; we admire her skill as often
as we are surprised by the extended, varied and complicated effects
which we find in those of her works that we take the pains to
investigate; she is not, however, either more or less skilful in any one
of her works than in the rest. We no more comprehend how she could
produce a stone or a piece of metal than how she could produce a head
organized like that of Newton. We call that man skilful who can perform
things which we are unable to perform ourselves. Nature can perform
everything; and when anything exists, it is a proof that she was able to
make it. Thus, it is only in relation to ourselves that we ever judge
nature to be skilful; we compare it in those cases with ourselves; and,
as we possess a quality which we call intelligence, by the aid of which
we produce works, in which we display our skill, we thence conclude that
the works of nature, which must excite our astonishment and admiration,
are not in fact hers, but the productions of an artificer, intelligent
like ourselves, and whose intelligence we proportion, in our minds, to
the degree of astonishment excited in us by his works; that is, in fact,
to our own weakness and ignorance."
See the reply to these arguments under the articles on "Atheism" and
"God," and in the following section, written long before the "System of
Nature."
SECTION II.
If a clock is not made in order to tell the time of the day, I will then
admit that final causes are nothing but chimeras, and be content to go
by the name of a final-cause-finder--in plain language, fool--to the end
of my life.
All the parts, however, of that great machine, the world, seem made for
one another. Some philosophers affect to deride final causes, which were
rejected, they tell us, by Epicurus and Lucretius. But it seems to me
that Epicurus and Lucretius rather merit the derision. They tell you
that the eye is not made to see; but that, since it was found out that
eyes were capable of being used for that purpose, to that purpose they
have been applied. According to them, the mouth is not formed to speak
and eat, nor the stomach to digest, nor the heart to receive the blood
from the veins and impel it through the arteries, nor the feet to walk,
nor the ears to hear. Yet, at the same time, these very shrewd and
consistent persons admitted that tailors made garments to clothe them,
and masons built houses to lodge them; and thus ventured to deny
nature--the great existence, the universal intelligence--what they
conceded to the most insignificant artificers employed by themselves.