A Philosophical Dictionary, Volume 05 — Voltaire — John Shaqi
A Philosophical Dictionary, Volume 05
Voltaire · en
Some point us to the irregularities of our globe, the volcanoes, the
plains of moving sand, some small mountains swallowed up in the ocean,
others raised by earthquakes, etc. But does it follow from the naves of
your chariot wheel taking fire, that your chariot was not made expressly
for the purpose of conveying you from one place to another?
The chains of mountains which crown both hemispheres, and more than six
hundred rivers which flow from the foot of these rocks towards the sea;
the various streams that swell these rivers in their courses, after
fertilizing the fields through which they pass; the innumerable
fountains which spring from the same source, which supply necessary
refreshment, and growth, and beauty to animal and vegetable life; all
this appears no more to result from a fortuitous concourse and an
obliquity of atoms, than the retina which receives the rays of light, or
the crystalline humor which refracts it, or the drum of the ear which
admits sound, or the circulation of the blood in our veins, the systole
and diastole of the heart, the regulating principle of the machine of
life.
SECTION III.
It would appear that a man must be supposed to have lost his senses
before he can deny that stomachs are made for digestion, eyes to see,
and ears to hear.
On the other hand, a man must have a singular partiality for final
causes, to assert that stone was made for building houses, and that
silkworms are produced in China that we may wear satins in Europe.
But, it is urged, if God has evidently done one thing by design, he has
then done all things by design. It is ridiculous to admit Providence in
the one case and to deny it in the others. Everything that is done was
foreseen, was arranged. There is no arrangement without an object, no
effect without a cause; all, therefore, is equally the result, the
product of the final cause; it is, therefore, as correct to say that
noses were made to bear spectacles, and fingers to be adorned with
rings, as to say that the ears were formed to hear sounds, the eyes to
receive light.
All that this objection amounts to, in my opinion, is that everything is
the result, nearer or more remote, of a general final cause; that
everything is the consequence of eternal laws. When the effects are
invariably the same in all times and places, and when these uniform
effects are independent of the beings to which they attach, then there
is visibly a final cause.
All animals have eyes and see; all have ears and hear; all have mouths
with which they eat; stomachs, or something similar, by which they
digest their food; all have suitable means for expelling the fæces; all
have the organs requisite for the continuation of their species; and
these natural gifts perform their regular course and process without any
application or intermixture of art. Here are final causes clearly
established; and to deny a truth so universal would be a perversion of
the faculty of reason.