4. The names of _just_, _unjust_, _justice_, _injustice_, are equivocal, and signify diversly. For justice and injustice, when they be attributed to actions, signify the same thing with _no injury_, and _injury_, and denominate the action _just_, or _unjust_, but not the man so. For they denominate him _guilty_, or _not guilty_. But when justice or injustice, are attributed to men, they signify _proneness_, and affection and inclination of nature, that is to say, passions of the mind, apt to produce just and unjust actions. So that when a man is said to be just, or unjust; not the action, but the passion and aptitude, to do such actions, is considered. And therefore a just man may have committed an unjust act; and an unjust man may have done justly, not only one, but most of his actions. For there is an _oderunt peccare_ in the unjust, as well as in the just, but from different causes. For the unjust man who abstaineth from injuries for fear of punishment, declareth plainly, that the justice of his actions dependeth upon civil constitution, from whence punishments proceed, which would otherwise in the estate of nature be unjust, according to the fountain from whence they spring. This distinction therefore of _justice_, and _injustice_, ought to be remembered, that when injustice is taken for guilty, the action is unjust, but not therefore the man; and when justice is taken for _guiltlessness_, the actions are just, and yet not always the man. Likewise when justice and injustice are taken for habits of the mind, the man may be just, or unjust, and yet not all his actions so. [Sidenote: Justice not rightly divided into commutative, and distributive.]