5. Concerning the justice of actions, the same is usually divided into two kinds, whereof men call the one _commutative_, and the other _distributive_; and are said to consist, the one in proportion _arithmetical_; the other in _geometrical_: and _commutative_ justice, they place in permutation, as buying, selling, and bartering; _distributive_, in giving to every man according to their deserts. Which distinction is not well made, inasmuch as injury, which is the injustice of action, consisteth not in the inequality of the things changed, or distributed, but in the inequality that men, contrary to nature and reason, assume unto themselves above their fellows. Of which inequality, shall be spoken hereafter. And for _commutative_ justice placed in buying and selling, though the thing bought be unequal to the price given for it, yet forasmuch as both the buyer and the seller are made judges of the value, and are thereby both satisfied, there can be no injury done on either side, neither party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for _distributive_ justice, which consisteth in the distribution of our own benefits, seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own, because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure, it can be no injury to any man, though our liberality be farther extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant: and then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant, and not in the inequality of distribution. [Sidenote: It is a law of nature, that he that is trusted, turn not that trust to the damage of him that trusteth] 6. It happeneth many times that man benefitteth, or contributeth, to the power of another, without any covenant, but only upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other, whereby he may procure a greater, or no less benefit, and assistance to himself. For by necessity of nature, every man doth in all his voluntary actions intend some good unto himself. In this case it is a law of nature, _That no man suffer him, that thus trusteth to his charity, or good affection towards him, to be in the worse estate for his trusting_. For if he shall so do, men will not dare to confer mutually to each other’s defence, nor put themselves into each other’s mercy upon any terms whatsoever, but rather abide the utmost and worst event of hostility; by which general diffidence, men will not only be enforced to war, but also afraid to come so much within the danger of one another, as to make any overture of peace. But this is to be understood of those only, that confer their benefits (as I have said) upon trust only, and not for triumph or ostentation. For as when they do it upon trust, the end they aimed at, namely to be well used, is the reward; so also when they do it for ostentation, they have the reward in themselves. [Sidenote: Ingratitude defined.]