The Geneva Protocol — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Geneva Protocol
John Stuart Mill · en
These proposals by their advocates are thought to have the advantage of
adaptability to changing conditions and to be more conformable to the
theory of the consent of the governed as a basis of Government.[10]
Of course, changes of frontiers made by any form of tribunal would in a
sense be changes of frontiers made by agreement among the parties; for
there would be necessarily an agreement in advance setting up such a
tribunal and engaging to conform to its conclusions.
It may perhaps be imagined that as between two particular countries
some such arrangement is possible along limited lines and relating to a
particular area or areas. I doubt even this possibility; but certainly
no general agreement in accord with such theories is possible and in my
judgment it would be highly undesirable if it were possible.
A tribunal which was charged with the duty of determining changes in
frontiers would clearly be a superstate, full-fledged, and in any sense
of that much abused term. Obviously, a change of frontier, if it went
far enough, might result in the substantial, or even the literal,
disappearance of one state by its incorporation within the territories
of another. It is inconceivable that any country would agree to such a
proposition. Even if it were limited very strictly, it would present
enormous difficulties and would certainly arouse fierce passions, as is
well illustrated by {37} discussion regarding the tribunal which is now
sitting to consider the frontier between Northern and Southern Ireland.
Nor would the matter be resolved by the suggested idea of plebiscites.
Anyone who will consider this question of plebiscites will realize that
the determining factor is not wholly the vote itself but to a large
extent the terms in which the plebiscite paper is written. He who
drafts the agreement for the plebiscite has much to do with what the
plebiscite will determine.[11] The questions are: Is the area to vote
as a whole or by districts, and where is the line of the voting area to
be drawn? The first of these was one of the great questions in the
Upper Silesia case. To apply the idea to an existing episode, let us
again refer to the case of Ireland. If the plebiscite were in the
whole of Ireland, it would go for Dublin; if it were in Ulster, it
would go for Belfast; if it were in Tyrone or Fermanagh, the result
would perhaps depend on the exact date when it was taken, as recent
elections indicate.
Another difficulty about plebiscites is this: Is their effect perpetual
or not, and if not how long does it last? If Tyrone votes for Dublin
today, is it an eternal decision or only till another vote in 1930, or
till when? There must be some time limit at least; plebiscites cannot
be held every year or even every five years, a fact which illustrates
the quiet advantages of some kind of a _status quo_.