The Joyful Wisdom ("La Gaya Scienza") — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
The Joyful Wisdom ("La Gaya Scienza")
Nietzsche · en
with less disregard of himself, and had preserved himself
longer,—indeed, one readily admits an advantage therefrom, but one
esteems the other advantage, namely, that a _sacrifice_ has been made,
and that the disposition of the sacrificial animal has once more been
_obviously_ endorsed—as higher and more enduring. It is accordingly, on
the one part, the instrumental character in the virtues which is praised
when the virtues are praised, and on the other part, the blind, ruling
impulse in every virtue, which refuses to let itself be kept within
bounds by the general advantage to the individual; in short, what is
praised is the unreason in the virtues, in consequence of which the
individual allows himself to be transformed into a function of the
whole. The praise of the virtues is the praise of something which is
privately injurious to the individual; it is praise of impulses which
deprive man of his noblest self-love, and the power to take the best
care of himself. To be sure, for the teaching and embodying of virtuous
habits a series of effects of virtue are displayed, which make it appear
that virtue and private advantage are closely related,—and there is in
fact such a relationship! Blindly furious diligence, for example, the
typical virtue of an instrument, is represented as the way to riches and
honour, and as the most beneficial antidote to tedium and passion: but
people are silent concerning its danger, its greatest dangerousness.
Education proceeds in this manner throughout: it endeavours, by a series
of enticements and advantages, to determine the individual to a certain
mode of thinking and acting, which, when it has become habit, impulse
and passion, rules in him and over him, _in opposition to his ultimate
advantage_, but "for the general good." How often do I see that blindly
furious diligence does indeed create riches and honours, but at the same
time deprives the organs of the refinement by virtue of which alone an
enjoyment of riches and honours is possible; so that really the main
expedient for combating tedium and passion, simultaneously blunts the
senses and makes the spirit refractory towards new stimuli! (The busiest
of all ages—our age—does not know how to make anything out of its great
diligence and wealth, except always more and more wealth, and more and
more diligence; there is even more genius needed for laying out wealth
than for acquiring it!—Well, we shall have our "grandchildren"!) If the
education succeeds, every virtue of the individual is a public utility,
and a private disadvantage in respect to the highest private
end,—probably some psycho-æsthetic stunting, or even premature
dissolution. One should consider successively from the same standpoint
the virtues of obedience, chastity, piety, and justice. The praise of
the unselfish, self-sacrificing, virtuous person—he, consequently, who
does not expend his whole energy and reason for _his own_ conservation,